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ABSTRACT
Misinformation is an ever increasing problem that is difficult to
solve for the research community and has a negative impact on
the society at large. Very recently, the problem has been addressed
with a crowdsourcing-based approach to scale up labeling efforts:
to assess the truthfulness of a statement, instead of relying on a few
experts, a crowd of (non-expert) judges is exploited. We follow the
same approach to study whether crowdsourcing is an effective and
reliablemethod to assess statements truthfulness during a pandemic.
We specifically target statements related to the COVID-19 health
emergency, that is still ongoing at the time of the study and has
arguably caused an increase of the amount of misinformation that
is spreading online (a phenomenon for which the term “infodemic”
has been used). By doing so, we are able to address (mis)information
that is both related to a sensitive and personal issue like health and
very recent as compared to when the judgment is done: two issues
that have not been analyzed in related work.
In our experiment, crowd workers are asked to assess the truth-
fulness of statements, as well as to provide evidence for the assess-
ments as a URL and a text justification. Besides showing that the
crowd is able to accurately judge the truthfulness of the statements,
we also report results on many different aspects, including: agree-
ment among workers, the effect of different aggregation functions,
of scales transformations, and of workers background / bias. We
also analyze workers behavior, in terms of queries submitted, URLs
found / selected, text justifications, and other behavioral data like
clicks and mouse actions collected by means of an ad hoc logger.
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1 INTRODUCTION
“We’re concerned about the levels of rumours and misinfor-
mation that are hampering the response. [. . . ] we’re not just
fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic. Fake news
spreads faster and more easily than this virus, and is just as
dangerous. That’s why we’re also working with search and me-
dia companies like Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Tencent, Twitter,
TikTok, YouTube and others to counter the spread of rumours
and misinformation. We call on all governments, companies
and news organizations to work with us to sound the appropri-
ate level of alarm, without fanning the flames of hysteria.”
These are the alarming words used by Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghe-
breyesus, the WHO (World Health Organization) Director General
during his speech at the Munich Security Conference on 15 Febru-
ary 2020.1 It is telling that the WHO Director General chooses to
target explicitly misinformation related problems.
Indeed, during the still ongoing COVID-19 health emergency,
all of us have experienced mis- and dis-information. The research
community has focused on several COVID-19 related issues [4],
ranging from machine learning systems aiming to classify state-
ments and claims on the basis of their truthfulness [23], search
engines tailored to the COVID-19 related literature, as in the ongo-
ing TREC-COVID Challenge2 [26], topic-specific workshops like
the NLP COVID workshop at ACL’20,3 and evaluation initiatives
like the TREC Health Misinformation Track 2020.4 More than the
academic research community, commercial social media platforms
also have looked at this issue.5 Among all the approaches, in some
very recent work, Roitero et al. [27], La Barbera et al. [17], Roitero
et al. [29] have studied if crowdsourcing can be used to identify
misinformation. As it is well known, crowdsourcing means to out-
source to a large mass of unknown people (the “crowd”), by means
1https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/munich-security-conference
2https://ir.nist.gov/covidSubmit/
3https://www.nlpcovid19workshop.org/
4https://trec-health-misinfo.github.io/
5https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2020/03/27/finding-the-truth-about-
covid-19-how-facebook-twitter-and-instagram-are-tackling-fake-news/ and
https://spectrum.ieee.org/view-from-the-valley/artificial-intelligence/machine-
learning/how-facebook-is-using-ai-to-fight-covid19-misinformation
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of an open call, a task that is usually performed by a few experts.
That recent work [17, 27, 29] specifically crowdsource the task of
misinformation identification, or rather assessment of the truthful-
ness of statements made by public figures (e.g., politicians), usually
on political, economical, and societal issues. That the crowd is able
to identify misinformation might sound implausible at first—isn’t
the crowd the very mean to spread misinformation? However, on
the basis of recent research [17, 27, 29], it appears that the crowd
can provide high quality truthfulness labels, provided that adequate
countermeasures and quality assurance techniques are employed.
In this paper we address the very same problem, but focusing on
statements about COVID-19. This is motivated by several reasons.
First, COVID-19 is of course a hot topic but, although there is a
great amount of researchers efforts worldwide devoted to its study,
there is no study yet using crowdsourcing to assess truthfulness
of COVID-19 related statements. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to report on crowd assessment of COVID-19 related
misinformation. Second, the health domain is particularly sensitive,
so it is interesting to understand if the crowdsourcing approach is
adequate also in such a particular domain. Third, in the previous
work [17, 27, 29] the statements judged by the crowd were not re-
cent. This means that evidence on statement truthfulness was often
available out there (on the Web), and although the experimental
design prevented to easily find that evidence, it cannot be excluded
that the workers did find it, or perhaps they were familiar with the
particular statement because, for instance, it had been discussed
in the press. By focusing on COVID-19 related statements we in-
stead naturally target recent statements: in some cases the evidence
might be still out there, but this will happen more rarely. Fourth, an
almost ideal tool to address misinformation would be a crowd able
to assess truthfulness in real time, immediately after the statement
becomes public: although we are not there yet, and there is a long
way to go, we find that targeting recent statements is a step forward
in the right direction. Fifth, our experimental design differs in some
aspects from that used in previous work, and allows us to address
novel research questions.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 COVID-19 Infodemic
The number of initiatives to apply Information Access—and, in gen-
eral, Artificial Intelligence—techniques to combat the COVID-19
infodemic has been rapidly increasing (see Bullock et al. [4, p. 16]
for a survey). There is significant effort on analyzing COVID-19
information on social media, and linking to data from external fact-
checking organizations to quantify the spread of misinformation
[7, 11, 32]. Mejova and Kalimeri [19] analyzed Facebook advertise-
ments related to COVID-19, and found that around 5% of them
contain errors or misinformation. Crowdsourcing methodologies
have also been used to collect and analyze data from patients with
cancer who are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic [8]. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no work addressing the COVID-19
infodemic using crowdsourcing.
2.2 Crowdsourcing Truthfulness
Recent work has focused on the automatic classification of truth-
fulness or fact checking [2, 9, 15, 20, 22, 24]. Zubiaga and Ji [33]
investigated, using crowdsourcing, the reliability of tweets in the
setting of disaster management. CLEF developed a Fact-Checking
Lab [9, 22] to address the issue of ranking sentences according to
some fact-checking property.
There is recent work that studies how to collect truthfulness
judgments by means of crowdsourcing using fine grained scales
[17, 27, 29]. Samples of statements from the PolitiFact dataset—
originally published by Wang [31]—have been used to analyze the
agreement of workers with labels provided by experts in the origi-
nal dataset. Workers are asked to provide the truthfulness of the
selected statements, by means of different fine grained scales. Roi-
tero et al. [27] compared two fine grained scales: one in the [0, 100]
range and one in the (0,+∞) range, on the basis of Magnitude
Estimation [21]. They found that both scales allow to collect reli-
able truthfulness judgments that are in agreement with the ground
truth. Furthermore, they show that the scale with one hundred
levels leads to slightly higher agreement levels with the expert
judgments. On a larger sample of PolitiFact statements, La Bar-
bera et al. [17] asked workers to use the original scale used by the
PolitiFact experts and the scale in the [0, 100] range. They found
that aggregated judgments (computed using the mean function
for both scales) have a high level of agreement with expert judg-
ments. Recent work by Roitero et al. [29] found similar results in
terms of external agreement and its improvement when aggregat-
ing crowdsourced judgments, using statements from two different
fact-checkers: PolitiFact and RMIT ABC Fact Check (ABC). Pre-
vious work has also looked at internal agreement, i.e., agreement
among workers [27, 29]. Roitero et al. [29] found that scales have
low levels of agreement when compared with each other: corre-
lation values for aggregated judgments on the different scales are
around ρ = 0.55 − 0.6 for PolitiFact and ρ = 0.35 − 0.5 for ABC,
and τ = 0.4 for PolitiFact and τ = 0.3 for ABC. This indicates that
the same statements tend to be evaluated differently in different
scales.
There is evidence of differences on the way workers provide
judgments, influenced by the sources they examine, as well as the
impact of worker bias. In terms of sources, La Barbera et al. [17]
found that that the vast majority of workers (around 73% for both
scales) use indeed the PolitiFact website to provide judgments.
Differently from La Barbera et al. [17], Roitero et al. [29] used a cus-
tom search engine in order to filter out PolitiFact and ABC from
the list of results. Results show that, for all the scales, Wikipedia
and news websites are the most popular sources of evidence used
by the workers. In terms of worker bias, La Barbera et al. [17] and
Roitero et al. [29] found that worker political background has an
impact on how workers provide the truthfulness scores. More in
detail, they found that workers are more tolerant and moderate
when judging statements from their very own political party.
3 AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
When compared to previous work, in this paper we aim to focus on
several novel aspects. With respect to La Barbera et al. [17], Roitero
et al. [27, 29], we focus on claims about COVID-19, which are
recent and interesting for the research community, and are arguably
on a more relevant/sensitive topic to the workers. We investigate
whether the health domain makes a difference in the ability of
crowd workers to identify and correctly classify (mis)information,
and if the very recent nature of COVID-19 related statements has
an impact as well. We focus on a single truthfulness scale, given the
evidence that the scale used does not make a significant difference
[17, 27, 29]. Another important difference is that we ask workers to
provide a textual justification for their decision: we analyze them
to better understand the process followed by workers to verify
information, and we investigate if they can be exploited to derive
useful information. Finally, we also exploit and analyze worker
behavior.
We investigate the following specific Research Questions:
RQ1 Are the crowd workers able to detect and objectively catego-
rize online (mis)information related to the medical domain
and more specifically to COVID-19? Which are the rela-
tionship and agreement between the crowd and the expert
labels?
RQ2 Can the crowdsourced and/or the expert judgments be trans-
formed or aggregated in a way that it improves the abil-
ity of workers to detect and objectively categorize online
(mis)information?
RQ3 Which is the effect of workers’ political bias in objectively
identifying online misinformation? And the effect of work-
ers’ background and Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) perfor-
mances?
RQ4 Which are the signals provided by the workers while per-
forming the task that can be recorded? To what extent are
these signals related to workers’ accuracy? Can these signals
be exploited to improve accuracy and, for instance, aggregate
the labels in a more effective way?
RQ5 Which sources of information does the crowd consider when
identifying online misinformation? Are some sources more
useful? Do some sources lead to more accurate and reliable
assessments by the workers?
4 METHODS
In this section we present the dataset used to carry out our experi-
ments (Section 4.1), and the crowdsourcing task design (Section 4.2).
Overall, we considered one dataset annotated by experts, one crowd-
sourced dataset, one judgment scale (the same for the expert and
the crowd judgments), and a total of 60 statements.
4.1 Dataset
We considered as primary source of information the PolitiFact
dataset [31] that was built as a “benchmark dataset for fake news
detection” [31] and contains over 12k statements produced by pub-
lic appearances of US politicians. The statements of the datasets are
labeled by expert judges on a six-level scale of truthfulness (from
now on referred to as E6): pants-on-fire, false, mostly-false,
half-true, mostly-true, and true. Recently, the PolitiFactweb-
site (the source from where the statements of the PolitiFact
dataset are taken) created a specific section related to the COVID-19
pandemic.6 For this work, we selected 10 statements for each of the
six PolitiFact categories, belonging to such a COVID-19 section
and with dates ranging from February 2020 to early April 2020.
Table 1 contains some examples of the statements we used.
6https://www.politifact.com/coronavirus/
Table 1: Examples of COVID-19 fact-checked statements.
Statement Source Year Label
“We inherited a broken test for COVID-19.” Donald
Trump
2020 pants-on-fire
“Church services cannot resume until we are
all vaccinated, says Bill Gates.”
Bloggers 2020 false
“Says a 5G law passed while everyone was
distracted with the coronavirus pandemic
and lists 20 symptoms associated with 5G
exposure.”
Facebook
Post
2020 mostly-false
“Says a California surfer was alone, in the
ocean, when he was arrested for violating
the stateâĂŹs stay-at-home order.”
Facebook
Post
2020 mostly-true
“Photo shows a crowded New York City
subway train during stay-at-home order.”
Viral
Image
2020 true
4.2 Crowdsourcing Experimental Setup
To collect our judgments we used the crowdsourcing platform
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Each worker, upon accepting
our HIT, is redirected to an external server to complete the task;
we set the payment to $1.5 for a set of 8 statements7. The task
itself is as follows: first, a (mandatory) questionnaire is shown to
the worker, to collect his/her background information such as age
and political views. Then, the worker needs to provide answers to
three Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) questions, which are used to
measure the personal tendency to answer with an incorrect “gut”
response or engage in further thinking to find the correct answer
[10].8 After the questionnaire and CRT phase, the worker is asked to
asses the truthfulness of 8 statements: 6 from the dataset described
in 4.1 (one for each of the six considered PolitiFact categories)
and 2 special statements called Gold Questions, one clearly true
and the other clearly false, manually written by the authors of this
paper and used as quality checks. We used a randomization process
when building the HITs to avoid all the possible source of bias, both
within each HIT and considering the overall task.
To assess the truthfulness of each statement, the worker is shown:
the Statement, the Speaker/Source, and the Year in which the state-
ment was made. We asked the worker to provide the following
information: the truthfulness value for the statement using the
six-level scale adopted by PolitiFact, from now on referred to
as C6 (presented to the worker using a radio button containing
the label description for each category as reported in the original
PolitiFact website), a URL that s/he used as a source of infor-
mation for the fact checking, and a textual motivation for her/his
response (which can not include the URL, and should contain at
least 15 words). In order to prevent the user from using PolitiFact
as primary source of evidence, we implemented a custom search
engine, which is based on the Bing Web Search APIs9 and filters
out PolitiFact from the returned search results.
We logged the user behavior using a custom logger [12, 13], and
we implemented in the task the following quality checks: (i) the
judgments assigned to the gold questions have to be coherent (i.e.,
the judgment of the clearly false question should be lower than the
7Before deploying the task on MTurk, we investigated the average time spent to
complete the task, and we related it to the minimum US hourly wage.
8We used the same CRT settings as Roitero et al. [29].
9https://azure.microsoft.com/services/cognitive-services/bing-web-search-api/
one assigned to true question); and (ii) the cumulative time spent
to perform each judgment should be of at least 10 seconds. Note
that the CRT (and the questionnaire) answers were not used for
quality check, although the workers were not aware of that.
Overall, we used 60 statements in total (10 for each PolitiFact
category), and each statement has been evaluated by 10 distinct
workers. Thus, we deployed 100 MTurk HITs and we collected
800 judgments in total. The crowd task was launched on May 1st,
2020 and it completed on May 4th, 2020. All the data used to carry
out our experiments can be downloaded at https://github.com/
KevinRoitero/crowdsourcingTruthfulness.
5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
We first report some descriptive statistics about the population of
workers and the data collected in our experiment (Section 5.1). Then,
we address crowd accuracy (i.e., RQ1) in Section 5.2, transformation
of truthfulness scales (RQ2) in Section 5.3, worker background and
bias (RQ3) in Section 5.4, worker behavior (RQ4) in Section 5.5;
finally, we study information sources (RQ5) in Section 5.6.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics
5.1.1 Worker Background, Abandonment, and Bias.
Questionnaire. Overall, 1113 workers resident in the United States
participated in our experiment.10 In each HIT, workers were first
asked to complete a demographics questionnaire with questions
about their gender, age, education and political views. By analyzing
the answers to the questionnaire we derived the following demo-
graphic statistics. The majority of workers are in the 26–35 age
range (44%), followed by 36–50 (25%), and 19–25 (18%). The ma-
jority of workers are well educated: 47% of them have a four year
college degree or a bachelor degree, 21% have a college degree, and
17% have a postgraduate or professional degree. Only about 15%
of workers have a high school degree or less. Concerning political
views, we had 28% of workers that identified themselves as liberals,
28% as moderate, 24% as conservative, 11% as very conservative and
9% as very liberal. Moreover, 44% of workers identified themselves
as being Democrat, 31% as being Republican, and 22% as being
Independent. Finally, 46% of workers agree on building a wall on
the southern US border, and 42% of them disagree. Overall we can
say that our sample is well balanced.
CRT Test. Analyzing the CRT scores, we found that: 31% of workers
did not provide any correct answer, 34% answered correctly to 1
test question, 18% answered correctly to 2 test questions, and only
17% answered correctly to all 3 test questions.
Abandonment. When considering the abandonment ratio (measured
according to the definition provided by Han et al. [12], Han et al.
[13]), we found that 100 of the workers (about 9%) successfully
completed the task, 991 (about 87%) abandoned (i.e., voluntarily
terminated the task before completing it), and 45 (about 4%) failed
(i.e., terminated the task due to failing the quality checks too many
times). Most of the abandonment (80% of the 1091 workers, 85%
of the 991 workers that abandoned) happened before judging the
first statement (i.e., before really starting the task); about 7.52% of
10Workers provide proof that they are based in US and have the eligibility to work.
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Figure 1: Distribution (in blue) and the cumulative distribu-
tion (in red) of the individual (left), gold (middle), and aggre-
gated with mean (right).
the 1091 workers (8% of the 991 of the workers that abandoned)
abandoned after the last statement (most likely once failed the
quality check).
5.1.2 Crowdsourced Scores. Figure 1 shows the distribution (in
blue) and the cumulative distribution (in red) of the individual (left),
gold (middle), and aggregated with mean (right) scores provided
by the workers for the considered PolitiFact statements.
If we focus on the distribution of the individual scores (left plot),
we can see that the distribution is quite well balanced, just lightly
skewed towards higher truthfulness values, represented in the right-
most part of the plot. This behavior is also remarked when focusing
on the red line representing the cumulative distribution, which
displays almost evenly spaced steps. This is a first indication that
suggests that crowd judgments are overall of a decent quality; in
fact, our empirical distribution is not distant from the ideal one:
since we considered 10 statements for each PolitiFact category,
the perfect distribution would have been the uniform distribution.
Turning to the distribution of the gold scores (i.e., the two special
statements used for quality check, shown in the middle plot), we
see that the large majority of workers (i.e., 70% for High and 43%
for Low) used the extreme values of the scale (i.e., pants-on-fire
and true); furthermore, we see that overall the High gold question
has been judged correctly more times than the Low gold question,
suggesting the probably the workers found the former easier to
judge than the latter.
We now turn to analyze the distribution of the scores when
aggregated using the mean function (shown in the right plot). The
distribution for the aggregated scores becomes roughly bell-shaped,
and slightly skewed towards high truthfulness values—this behavior
is consistent with the findings of Roitero et al. [29]. In the following
we discuss both the external (i.e., between workers and experts)
and internal (i.e., among workers) agreement of our dataset.
5.2 RQ1: Crowd Accuracy
5.2.1 External Agreement. To answer RQ1, we start by analyzing
the so called external agreement, i.e., the agreement between the
crowd collected labels and the experts ground truth. Figure 2 shows
the agreement between the PolitiFact experts (x-axis) and the
crowd judgments (y-axis). In the first plot, each point is a judgment
by a worker on a statement, i.e., there is no aggregation of the
workers working on the same statement. In the next plots all work-
ers redundantly working on the same statement are aggregated
using the mean (second plot), median (third plot), and majority
vote (right-most plot). If we focus on the first plot (i.e., the one
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Figure 2: The agreement between the PolitiFact experts (x-axis) and the crowd judgments (y-axis). From left to right: C6
individual judgments; C6 aggregated with mean; C6 aggregated with median; C6 aggregated with majority vote.
with no aggregation function applied), we can see that, overall, the
individual judgments are in agreement with the expert labels, as
shown by the median values of the boxplots, which are increasing
as the ground truth truthfulness level increases. Concerning the
aggregated values, it is the case that for all the aggregation func-
tions the pants-on-fire and false categories are perceived in a
very similar way by the workers; this behavior was already shown
in previous work [17, 29], and suggests that indeed workers have
clear difficulties in distinguishing between the two categories; this
is even more evident considering that the interface presented to the
workers contained a textual description of the categories’ meaning
in every page of the task.
If we look at the plots as a whole, we see that within each plot
the median values of the boxplots are increasing when going from
pants-on-fire to true (i.e., going from left to right of the x-axis of
each chart). This indicates that the workers are overall in agreement
with the PolitiFact ground truth, thus indicating that workers are
indeed capable of recognizing and correctly classifying misinforma-
tion statements related to the COVID-19 pandemic. This is a very
important and not obvious result: in fact, the crowd (i.e., the work-
ers) is the primary source and cause of the spread of disinformation
and misinformation statements across social media platforms [6].
By looking at the plots, and in particular focusing on the median
values of the boxplots, it appears evident that the mean (second plot)
is the aggregation function which leads to higher agreement levels,
followed by the median (third plot) and the majority vote (fourth
plot). Again, this behavior has already been noticed [17, 28, 29], and
all the cited works used the mean as primary aggregation function.
To validate the external agreement, we measured the statis-
tical significance between the aggregated rating for all the six
PolitiFact categories; we considered both the Mann-Whitney
rank test and the t-test, applying Bonferroni correction to account
for multiple comparisons. Results are as follows: when considering
adjacent categories (e.g., pants-on-fire and false), the difference
between categories are never significant, for both tests and for all
the three aggregation functions.When considering categories of dis-
tance 2 (e.g., pants-on-fire and mostly-false), the differences
are never significant, apart from the median aggregation function,
where there is statistical significance to the p < .05 level in 2/4
cases for both Mann-Whitney and t-test. When considering cate-
gories of distance 3, the differences are significant, for the mean, in
3/3 cases for the Mann-Whitney and 3/3 cases for the t-test, for the
median, in 2/3 cases for the Mann-Whitney and 3/3 cases for the
t-test, for the majority vote, in 0/3 cases for the Mann-Whitney and
pants-on-fire false mostly-false half-true mostly-true true
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Figure 3:Workers agreement:α [16] andΦ [5] (top plot); pair-
wise unit agreement (bottom plot).
1/3 cases for the t-test. When considering categories of distance 4
and 5, the differences are always significant to the p > 0.01 level
for all the aggregation functions and for all the tests, apart from
the case of the majority vote function and the Mann-Whitney test,
where the significance is at the p > .05 level. In the following we
use the mean as being the most commonly used approach for this
type of data [29].
5.2.2 Internal Agreement. Another standard way to address RQ1
and to analyze the quality of the work by the crowd is to compute
the so called internal agreement (i.e., the agreement among the
workers). Figure 3 shows in the first plot the agreement measured
with α [16] and Φ [5], two popular measures often used to compute
workers’ agreement in crowdsourcing tasks [18, 27–29]. The x-axis
details the PolitiFact categories, while the y-axis the level of
agreement measured; while α is a punctual measure, Φ allows to
compute confidence intervals for the agreement measure; the plot
shows the upper 97% and lower 3% confidence intervals as thinner
lines. As we can see from the plot, the agreement levels measured
with the two scales is very similar for the pants-on-fire, false,
mostly-false, and half-true categories: note that the α measure
always falls in the Φ confidence interval, and the little oscillations
in the agreement value are not always indication of a real change in
the agreement level, especially when considering α [5]. Having said
so, it appears that for all the two metrics the overall agreement falls
in the [0.15, 0.3] range, and the agreement level is similar for all
the PolitiFact categories, with the exception of Φ, which shows
higher agreement levels for the mostly-true and true categories.
This confirms the finding, derived from Figure 2, that workers
seem most effective in identifying and categorizing statements with
a higher truthfulness level. This remark is also supported by [5]
which shows that Φ is better in distinguishing agreement levels
in crowdsourcing than α , which is more indicated as a measure of
data reliability in non crowdsourced settings.
Figure 3 also shows in the second plot ameasure of the agreement
at the HIT level (i.e., in the set of 8 statements judged by each
worker) as detailed in [18, 29]. More in detail, the plot shows the
CCDF (Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function) of the
relative frequencies for the agreement of the 100 HITs considered
in this experiment. The plot shows that around 20% of the hits
have a pairwise agreement which is very close to 1; this indicates
that around 20% of the workers judged statements almost in the
same way as the expert judges. Moreover, we see that 60% of the
workers have a pairwise agreement greater than 0.5. Again, this
result indicates a good overall agreement between crowd and expert
judgments, confirming that the crowd is able to correctly identify
and classify misinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
5.3 RQ2: Transforming Truthfulness Scales
Given the positive results presented above, it appears that the an-
swer to RQ1 is overall positive, even if with some exceptions. There
are many remarks that can be made: first, there is a clear issue that
affects the pants-on-fire and false categories, which are very
often mis-classified by workers. Moreover, while PolitiFact used
a six-level judgment scale, the usage of a two- (e.g., True/False) and
a three-level (e.g., False / In between / True) scale is also common
when assessing the truthfulness of statements [17, 29]. Finally, cat-
egories can be merged together to improve accuracy, as done for
example by Tchechmedjiev et al. [30]. All these considerations lead
us to RQ2, addressed in the following.
5.3.1 Merging Ground Truth Levels. For all the above reasons, we
performed the following experiment: we group together the six
PolitiFact categories (i.e., E6) into three (referred to as E3) or two
(E2) categories, which we refer respectively with 01, 23, and 45 for
the three level scale, and 012 and 234 for the two level scale.
Figure 4 shows the result of such a process. As we can see from
the plots, the agreement between the crowd and the expert judg-
ments can be seen in a more neat way. As for Figure 2, the median
values for all the boxplots is increasing when going towards higher
truthfulness values (i.e., going from left to right within each plot);
this holds for all the aggregation functions considered, and it is
valid for both transformations of the E6 scale, into two and three
levels. Also in this case we computed the statistical significance
between categories, applying the Bonferroni correction to account
for multiple comparisons. Results are as follows. For the case of
three groups, both the categories at distance one and two are always
significant to the p < 0.01 level, for both the Mann-Whitney and
the t-test, for all three aggregation functions. The same behavior
holds for the case of two groups, where the categories of distance 1
are always significant to the p < 0.01 level.
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Figure 4: The agreement between the PolitiFact experts
and the crowd judgments. From left to right: C6 aggregated
with mean; C6 aggregated with median; C6 aggregated with
majority vote. First row: E6 to E3; second row: E6 to E2. Com-
pare with Figure 2.
Summarizing, we can now conclude that by merging the ground
truth levels we obtained a much stronger signal: the crowd can
effectively detect and classify misinformation statements related to
the COVID-19 pandemic.
5.3.2 Merging Crowd Levels. Having reported the results on merg-
ing the ground truth categories we now turn to transform the crowd
labels (i.e., C6) into three (referred to as C3) and two (C2) categories.
For the transformation process we rely on the approach detailed by
Han et al. [14], that also present a complete and exhaustive discus-
sion on the effectiveness of the scale transformation methods. This
approach has many advantages [14]: we can simulate the effect of
having the crowd answers in a more coarse-grained scale (rather
than C6), and thus we can simulate new data without running the
whole experiment on MTurk again. As we did for the ground truth
scale, we choose to select as target scales the two- and three- levels
scale, driven by the same motivations. Having selected C6 as being
the source scale, and having selected the target scales as the three-
and two- level ones (C3 and C2), we perform the following experi-
ment. We perform all the possible cuts11 from C6 to C3 and from
C6 to C2; then, we measure the internal agreement (using α and Φ)
both on the source and on the target scale, and we compare those
values. In such a way, we are able to identify, among all the possible
cuts, the cut which leads to the highest possible internal agreement.
Also in this case, a detailed discussion on the relationships between
internal agreement, effectiveness, and all the possible cuts can be
found in Han et al. [14].
Figure 5 shows the results. The x-axis shows the cut performed
to transform C6 into the target scale (C3 in the left-most plot, C2 in
the right-most plot), while the y-axis shows the internal agreement
score by means of either α or Φ. As we can see by inspecting the
left-most plot, (i.e., C6 to C3) we can see that there is, both for α
11C6 can be transformed into C3 in 10 different ways, and C6 can be transformed into
C2 in 5 different ways.
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Figure 5: α and Φ cuts. From left to right: C6 cut into three
levels (C3), C6 cut into two levels (C2). The cut is detailed in
the x-label. The dotted line is α / Φ on C6, the continuous
line is the average α / Φ score measured among all the cuts.
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Figure 6: Comparison with E6. C6 to C3 (first row) and to
C2 (second row), then aggregated with the mean function.
Best cut selected according to α (left column) and Φ (right
column) (see Figure 5). Compare with Figure 2.
and Φ, a single cut which leads to higher agreement levels with
the original C6 scale. On the contrary, if we focus on the rightmost
plot (i.e., C6 to C2), we can see that there is a single cut for α which
leads to similar agreement levels as in the original C6 scale, and
there are no cuts with such a property when using Φ.
Having identified the best possible cuts for both transformations
and for both agreement metrics, we now measure the external
agreement between the crowd and the expert judgments, using
the selected cut. Figure 6 shows such a result when considering
the judgments aggregated with the mean function. As we can see
from the plots, it is again the case that the median values of the
boxplots is always increasing, for all the transformations. Never-
theless, inspecting the plots we can state that the overall external
agreement appears to be lower than the one shown in Figure 2.
Moreover, we can also state that also in the case of the transformed
scales, the categories pants-on-fire and false are still not sep-
arable. Summarizing, we show that it is feasible to transform the
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Figure 7: C6 to C3 (first row) and to C2 (second row), then ag-
gregated with the mean function. First row: E6 to E3. Second
row: E6 to E2. Best cut selected according to α (left column)
and Φ (right column) (see Figure 5). Compare with Figures 2,
4, and 6.
judgments collected on a C6 level scale into two new scales, C3 and
C2, obtaining judgments with a similar internal agreement as the
original ones, and with a slightly lower external agreement with
the expert judgments.
5.3.3 Merging both Ground Truth and Crowd Levels. It is now natu-
ral to combine the two approaches. Figure 7 shows the comparison
between C6 transformed into C3 and C2, and E6 transformed into
E3 and E2. As we can see form the plots, also in this case the me-
dian values of the boxplots are increasing, especially for the E3 case
(shown in the first row). Furthermore, the external agreement with
the ground truth is present, even if for the E2 case (shown in the
second row) the classes appear to be not separable. Summarizing,
all these results show that it is feasible to successfully combine
the aforementioned approaches, and transform into a three- and
two-level scale both the crowd and the expert judgments.
5.4 RQ3: Worker Background and Bias
To address RQ3 we study if the answers to questionnaire and CRT
test have any relation to worker quality.
5.4.1 Questionnaire. Table 2 (top) shows in the rows the answer
to the workers political views, while on the columns the number of
correctly classified statements (columns, max is 6). As we can see
from the table, there is only one worker who successfully classified
all 6 statements. Many workers correctly classified 1 or 2 statements
(28 and 28, respectively). The next column summarizes, using Accu-
racy (i.e., the fraction of exactly classified statements), the quality of
workers in each group. The number and fraction of correctly classi-
fied statements are however rather crudemeasures of worker’s qual-
ity, as small misclassification errors (e.g, pants-on-fire in place of
false) are as important as more striking ones (e.g., pants-on-fire
in place of true). Therefore, to measure the ability of workers to
Table 2: Count of the number of workers depending on:
number of statements correctly classified (columns, max is
6), vs. (top table) the answers to the Political views question
(rows) and vs. (bottom table) the number of correct answers
to the CRT test (rows, max is 3). The last two columns show
the Accuracy (the fraction of correctly identified statements
for each group) and the CEMORD score.
Correctly classified statements Acc CEMORD
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sum Mean
Very conservative 4 3 1 0 0 0 1 9 .13 .46
Conservative 0 9 2 3 1 0 0 15 .21 .51
Moderate 6 6 6 7 0 1 0 26 .20 .50
Liberal 2 8 13 4 4 2 0 33 .16 .50
Very Liberal 0 2 6 6 2 1 0 17 .21 .51
Sum 12 28 28 20 7 4 1 100
Correctly classified statements Acc CEMORD
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sum Mean
CRT 0 5 11 9 4 0 1 1 31 .14 .48
correct 1 5 10 12 6 1 0 0 34 .22 .53
answers 2 1 6 1 6 3 1 0 18 .21 .51
3 1 1 6 4 3 2 0 17 .15 .47
Sum 12 28 28 20 7 4 1 100
correctly classify the statements, we also compute CEMORD, an effec-
tiveness metric recently proposed for the specific case of ordinal
classification [1] (see Roitero et al. [29, §3.3] for a more detailed
discussion of these issues). The last column in the table shows the
average CEMORD value for the workers in each group. By looking
at both Accuracy and CEMORD, it is clear that ‘Very conservative’
workers provide lower quality labels. The Bonferroni corrected two
tailed t-test on CEMORD confirms that ‘Very conservative’ workers
perform statistically significantly worse than both ‘Conservative’
and ‘Very liberal’ workers. The workers’ political views affect the
CEMORD score, even if in a small way and mainly when considering
the extremes of the scale. An initial analysis of the other answers
to the questionnaire (not shown due to space limitations) does not
seem to provide strong signals; a more detailed analysis is left for
future work.
5.4.2 CRT Test. We now investigate the effect of the CRT test on
the worker quality. Table 2 (bottom) shows the count of the number
of workers depending on: number of statements correctly classified
(columns, max is 6), versus the number of correct answers to the
CRT test (rows, max is 3). Concerning CRT scores, we see that the
minority of workers (17) answered in a correct way to all the three
questions, and the majority of them answered correctly to only 1
CRT question (34) or none (31). Although there is some variation in
both Accuracy and CEMORD, this is never statistically significant; it
appears that the number of correct answers to the CRT test is not
correlated with worker quality. We leave for future work a more
detailed study of this aspect.
5.5 RQ4: Worker Behavior
We now turn to RQ4, and analyze the behavior of the workers while
performing the task.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
statement index
150
200
250
300
350
tim
e 
ela
ps
ed
 (s
ec
)
0 1 2 3 4 5
E
0
1
2
3
4
5
C
Figure 8: Position of the statement in the task vs. time
elapsed, cumulative on each single statement (left). Compar-
ison between E6 and C6 where the aggregation function is
the weighted mean and the weights are the political views
(see Table 2 top) normalized to [0.5, 1] (right).
5.5.1 Time. Figure 8 (left) shows that the amount of time spent
on average by the workers on the first statements is considerably
higher than on the last statements. This, combined with the fact
that the quality of the assessment provided by the workers does
not decrease for the last statements (CEMORD scores per position are
1: .61, 2: .60, 3: .64, 4: .58, 5: .59, 6: .54, 7: .61, 8: .62), is an indication
of a learning effect: the workers learn how to assess truthfulness in
a faster way.
5.5.2 ExploitingWorker Signals to ImproveQuality. Wehave shown
that, while performing their task, workers provide many signals
that to some extent correlate with the quality of their work. These
signals could in principle be exploited to aggregate the individual
judgments in a more effective way (i.e., giving more weight to work-
ers that possess features indicating a higher quality). For example,
the relationships between worker background / bias and worker
quality (Section 5.4) could be exploited to this aim.
We thus performed the following experiment: we aggregated
C6 individual scores, using as aggregation function a weighted
mean, where the weights are represented by the political views,
normalized to [0.5, 1]. Figure 8 (right) shows the results. We also
aggregated C6 individual scores using as aggregation function the
weighted mean function where the weights are represented by the
number of correct answers to CRT, normalized to [0.5, 1], which
lead to similar results. Thus, it seems that leveraging quality-related
behavioral signals, like questionnaire answers or CRT scores, to
aggregate results does not provide a noticeable increase in the exter-
nal agreement, although it does not harm. We have only scratched
the surface, though, as there are many other signals, and aggrega-
tion functions, that can be tried; we leave for future work the in
depth analysis of how such behavioral signals can be leveraged to
improve external agreement.
5.5.3 Queries. Table 3 shows query statistics for the 100 workers
which finished the task. As we can see, the higher the statement
position, the lower the number of queries issued: 3.52 queries on
average for the first statement, down to 2.3 for the last statement.
This can indicate the attitude of workers to issue fewer queries the
more time they spend on the task, probably due to fatigue, boredom,
or learning effects. Nevertheless, we can see that on average, for all
the statement positions each worker issues more than one query,
i.e., workers often reformulate their initial query. This provides
further evidence that they put effort in performing the task. The
Table 3: Statement position in the task versus: number of
queries issued (top) and number of times the statement has
been used as a query (bottom).
Statement
Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sum Mean
Number
of Queries
352
16.8%
280
13.4%
259
12.4%
255
12.1%
242
11.6%
238
11.3%
230
11.0%
230
11.4% 2095 261.9
Statement
as Query
22
9%
32
13%
31
12.6%
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13.9%
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12.2%
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snopes.com 11.79%
msn.com 8.93%
factcheck.org 6.79%
wral.com 6.79%
usatoday.com 5.36%
statesman.com 4.64%
reuters.com 4.64%
cdc.gov 4.29%
mediabiasfactcheck.com 4.29%
businessinsider.com 3.93%
Figure 9: On the left, distribution of the ranks of the URLs
selected byworkers, on the right, websites fromwhichwork-
ers chose URLs to justify their judgments.
third row of the table shows the number of times the worker used
as query the whole statement. We can see that the percentage is
rather low (around 13%) for all the statement positions, indicating
again that workers spend effort when providing their judgments.
5.6 RQ5: Sources of Information
5.6.1 URL Analysis. Figure 9 shows on the left the distribution
of the ranks of the URL selected as evidence by the worker when
performing each judgment. URLs selected less than 1% times are
filtered out from the results. As we can see from the plot, about 40%
of workers selected the first result retrieved by our search engine,
and selected the remaining positions less frequent, with an almost
monotonic decreasing frequency (rank 8 makes the exception).
We also found that 14% of workers inspected up to the fourth
page of results (i.e., rank= 40). The breakdown on the truthfulness
PolitiFact categories does not show any significant difference.
Figure 9 shows on the right part the top 10 of websites from
which the workers choose the URL to justify their judgments. Web-
sites with percentage ≤ 3.9% are filtered out. As we can see from
the table, there are many fact check websites among the top 10
URLs (e.g., snopes: 11.79%, factcheck 6.79%). Furthermore, medical
websites are present, although in small percentage (cdc: 4.29%). This
indicates that workers use various kind of sources as URLs from
which they take information. Thus, it appears that they put effort
in finding evidence to provide a reliable truthfulness judgment.
5.6.2 Justifications. As a final result, we analyze the textual justifi-
cations provided, their relations with the web pages at the selected
URLs, and their links with worker quality. 54% of the provided
justifications contain text copied from the web page at the URL
selected for evidence, while 46% do not. Furthermore, 48% of the
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Figure 10: Effect of the origin of a justification (text
copied/not copied from the URL selected) on: the absolute
value of the prediction error (left; cumulative distributions
shown with thinner lines and empty markers), and the pre-
diction error (right).
justification include some “free text” (i.e., text generated and writ-
ten by the worker), and 52% do not. Considering all the possible
combinations, 6% of the justifications used both free text and text
from web page, 42% used free text but no text from the web page,
48% used no free text but only text from web page, and finally 4%
used neither free text nor text from web page, and either inserted
text from a page of a different (not selected) web page or inserted
part of the instructions we provided or text from the user interface.
Concerning the preferred way to provide justifications, each
worker seems to have a clear attitude: 48% of the workers used only
text copied from the selected web pages, 46% of the workers used
only free text, 4% used both, and 2% of them consistently provided
text coming from the user interface or random web pages.
We now correlate such a behavior with the workers quality. Fig-
ure 10 shows the relations between different kinds of justifications
and the worker accuracy. The plots show the absolute value of the
prediction error on the left, and the prediction error on the right.
The lines in the plots indicate if the text inserted by the worker
was copied or not from the web page selected. We did the same
analysis to investigate if the worker used or not free text, and the
plots where almost indistinguishable.
As we can see from the plot , statements on which workers make
less errors (i.e., where x-axis= 0) tend to use text copied from the
web page selected. On the contrary, statements on which workers
make more errors (values close to 5 in the left plot, and values
close to +/- 5 in the right plot) tend to use text not copied from
the selected web page. The differences are small, but it might be
an indication that workers of higher quality tend to read the text
from selected web page, and report it in the justification box. To
confirm this result, we computed the CEMORD scores for the two
classes considering the individual judgments: the class “copied” has
CEMORD = 0.62, while the class “not copied” has a lower value, CEMORD
= 0.58. The behavior is consistent for what concerns the usage of
free text (not shown).
By looking at the right column of Figure 10 we can see that
the distribution of the prediction error is not symmetrical, as the
frequency of the errors is higher on the positive side of the x-
axis ([0,5]). These errors correspond to workers overestimating
the truthfulness value of the statement (with 5 being the result of
labeling a pants-on-fire statement as true). This is consistent
with what observed in Sect. 5.1.2. It is also noticeable that the
justifications containing text copied from the selected URL have a
lower rate of errors in the negative range, meaning that workers
which directly quote the text avoid underestimating the truthfulness
of the statement. These could be other useful signals to be exploited
in future work to obtain more effective aggregation methods.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
The work presented in this paper is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first one investigating the ability of crowd workers to identify
and correctly categorize recent health statements related to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The workers performed a task consisting
of judging the truthfulness of 8 statements using our customized
search engine, which allows us to control worker behavior. We
analyze workers background and bias, as well as workers cognitive
abilities, and we correlate such information to the worker quality.
We publicly release the collected data to the research community.
The answers to our research questions can be summarized as
follows. We found evidence that the workers are able to detect
and objectively categorize online (mis)information related to the
COVID-19 pandemic (RQ1). We found that while the agreement
among workers does not provide a strong signal, aggregated work-
ers judgments show high levels of agreement with the expert labels,
with the only exception of the two truthfulness categories at the
lower end of the scale (pants-on-fire and false). We found that
both crowdsourced and expert judgments can be transformed and
aggregated to improve label quality (RQ2). We found that worker
political background, self-reported in a questionnaire, is indicative
of label quality (RQ3). We found several promising behavioral sig-
nals that are clearly related with worker quality (RQ4). Such signals
may effectively inform new ways of aggregating crowd judgments
(e.g., see [3, 25]), which we believe is a promising direction for
future work. Finally, we found that workers use multiple sources
of information, and they consider both fact-checking and health-
related websites. We also found interesting relations between the
justifications provided by the workers and the judgment quality
(RQ5). Future work also includes reproducing our experiments in
other crowdsourcing platforms to target other cohorts of workers.
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